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Loss Aversion and Intertemporal Choice: 
A Laboratory Investigation 
 
We present results from a laboratory study of loss aversion in the context of intertemporal 
choice. We investigate whether the provision of (windfall) endowments results in different 
elicited discount rates relative to subjects who earn income or earn and retain the income for 
a period before making intertemporal decisions. We hypothesize that loss aversion in an 
intertemporal choice yields higher discount rates among subjects earning and retaining. Our 
results support this hypothesis: among subjects who earn and retain their income we elicit 
substantially higher discount rates relative to those experiencing a windfall gain. 
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1  Introduction  
In this paper, we explore the role of loss aversion in intertemporal decision making, 
using a laboratory experiment. We implement loss aversion using a unique design 
wherein (i) individuals either receive an endowment of money income or earn money 
income in the laboratory and (ii) where income earned in the lab may be retained by 
subjects for a week prior to making incentive compatible intertemporal choices. Our 
results show that earning income (as opposed to receiving an endowment) does not by 
itself create a sufficient sense of entitlement to generate significant changes in elicited 
d i s c o u n t  r a t e s .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  d o  f i n d  c o m p elling evidence that loss aversion, arising 
from income that is e a rned in the laboratory and retained prior to decision making, 
increases average discount rates by over 60%. This result is particularly important for 
those interested in studying savings and other intertemporal financial decisions in the 
laboratory.  
 
2  An intertemporal choice experiment 
We elicited discount rates from participants using a method utilized in many studies 
of intertemporal decision making (e.g., Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002; 
McLeish and Oxoby, 2007). This elicitation procedure involved participants completing 
Table 1 by indicating whether they preferred option A (a constant amount of money to 
be received after the laboratory session) or option B (a larger amount of money to be 
received two weeks after the session) across eleven different alternatives.  The same 
table was used in each of the treatments described below. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In Table 1, the amounts under ‘option B’ represent two-week discount rates ranging 
from 0% to 27.5%. The point in the table where an individual ceases choosing option A 
and begins choosing option B (i.e., their cross-over point) proxies the individuals two- 
   3
week discount rate (outcome variable: A-rate). Individuals were compensated for their 
participation based on the answers they provided in Table 1: at the end of the 
experiment, one of the twelve payoff alternatives was randomly selected and each 
individual received a (potentially post-dated) check for the dollar amount corresponding 
to their choice.1 This procedure was followed across all the treatments described below. 
In addition to this payment for participation, individuals were also paid a $5 cash show-
up fee for attending the session.2 
It is worth commenting on three aspects of our design. First, in Table 1 under payoff 
alternative 1 option B returns 0% (i.e., the individual decides between $40 today and $40 
in two weeks). This was done as a means to check individuals’ understanding of the 
problem: if individuals value receiving money sooner rather than later, all individuals 
should prefer option A when both options return $40. Secondly, in order to compensate 
individuals for any transaction costs (real or imagined) regarding the money,  we chose 
significantly large discount rates (i.e., larger than those paid by financial institutions). 
We do not feel that this compromises our results as our primary interest is in the effect 
of our treatments on the elicited discount rates not the value of the interest rates per se.3  
Lastly, we did not use a front-end delay (e.g., option A amounts in Table 1 involve 
money being available immediately; cf. Coller and Williams, 1999, and McLeish and 
Oxoby, 2007). Harrison et  al. (2005) argues that a front-end delay is necessary to 
eliminate (or reduce) the immediacy of potential consumption and the perceived 
differences in transaction costs between the two options. As mention above, we have 
                                                      
1 For example, suppose after an individual completed Table 1, question 6 was randomly chosen to 
determine her payment for participation.  If in her response to this question she indicated that she 
preferred $40 to be paid immediately, she received a check dated the day of the experiment for 
$40. If her response to this question indicated she preferred $45 in two weeks, she received a 
check on the day of the session for $45 but post-dated for two weeks from the date of that session. 
Full instructions for the experiment are available from the authors upon request. 
2 The show-up fee was used as an inducement to encourage individuals to attend the experiment. 
We chose to pay all individuals by check regardless of the implemented option to maintain 
consistency between those receiving a check dated currently and those receiving a post-dated 
check. In reviewing the checks used in the experiment, we found that no post-dated checks were 
cashed before the date indicated on the check.  
3 Previous studies (Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002) have utilized interest rates 
which more closely mirror those paid by banks. However, these studies also used longer time 
horizons (e.g., choices between amounts to be received in three or six months).  
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controlled for perceived transaction cost differences by paying according to discount 
rates that are significantly higher than market rates and by paying individuals by check. 
With respect to the immediacy of consumption, since our objective was to evoke loss 
aversion we specifically avoided using a front-end delay in order to exploit this 
immediacy and to create an effect related to immediate versus deferred consumption. 
2.1  Treatments 
We conducted three treatments. In our endowment treatment individuals were simply 
asked to complete Table 1 knowing that their payment would be based on their answer 
to a randomly selected payoff alternative. As such, participants were implicitly endowed 
with $40 over which they made intertemporal choices. At the end of the session, 
participants received a $5 cash show-up fee and a check payable the day of the session 
for $40 or post-dated for a larger amount. 
In our earnings treatment, participants were given a twenty-question quiz consisting 
of questions from the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). Participants were told they could 
earn either $20 or $40 based on their exam performance. If they answered at least ten 
questions correctly they would earn $40; if their score on the exam was less than ten 
questions correctly answered they would receive $20.4  This earned money was 
subsequently used when individuals completed Table 1. The central motivation in this 
treatment was to see (i) if earning the money (receivable after the session) would create a 
sense of entitlement or legitimacy of these assets as has been identified in experiments 
on social preferences (Cherry et  al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008) and (ii) if this 
sense of entitlement or asset legitimacy affected elicited discount rates. Our hypothesis 
was that individuals would feel they had earned the $40 being used as the default option 
in Table 1. As in the endowment treatment, individuals received a $5 cash show-up fee 
and a check dated for a chosen amount based on a randomly selected amount from their 
responses to the payoff alternatives in Table 1. 
                                                      
4This threshold was chosen based on previous experiments in order to ensure that most 
participants would earn $40 while still requiring that they exert significant effort. All participants 
did sufficiently well on the selected questions to reach the $40 threshold.   
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In our returning treatment, individuals participated in two sessions. In session 1 they 
earned money as in the earnings treatment but were paid these amounts in cash at the 
end of the session. Participants were then told they had an opportunity to receive   
additional funds in session the following week in which they were required to bring the 
amount they had earned in current session. In this subsequent session, participants were 
asked to put the money they had previously earned into envelopes that were collected 
by the experimenter. Participants then completed Table 1 and received a $5 show-up fee 
and a check based on a randomly selected alternative from Table 1. Our hypothesis in 
this session was that both the earning behaviour and the fact that individuals had the 
money in their possession for a week would create a stronger sense of entitlement and  
affect their intertemporal decisions. In this treatment, individuals only received a $5 
show-up fee for participation in the final session. 
In addition to the data we collected regarding participants’ intertemporal preferences 
using Table 1, we also asked participants to complete a short questionnaire at the end of 
each session. In addition to questions regarding demographic information, the 
questionnaire also included two questions regarding individuals attitudes towards the 
money used in the experiment:  
 
1.  Outcome variable: asset legitimacy 1, AS1: ‘I am entitled to the money I received 
for participating in the experiment’. (Answered using a 1 to 7 scale 
representing ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.) 
2.  Outcome variable: asset legitimacy 2, AS2: ‘I earned the money I am receiving for 
participating in the experiment’. (Answered using a 1 to 7 scale representing 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.) 
 
Participants in the returning treatment were also asked the following yes/no questions:  
 
1.  Is the cash you brought to today’s experiment the same bills you were given in 
the previous session?   
2.  If not, did you spend the cash you were given in the previous session?   
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2.2  Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses for this experiment revolve around the idea of loss aversion (e.g., 
Kahneman et al., 1991). We hypothesize that if individuals are resistant to putting off 
current consumption (i.e., treating a potential reduction in current consumption as a 
“loss”) they should require greater compensation for deferring consumption. This 
greater compensation would manifest itself in Table 1 via individuals choosing higher 
crossing points (i.e., choosing option A for higher payoff alternatives effectively 
requiring a higher interest rate to put off current consumption).  
 
Hypothesis 1  
Participants will experience a greater sense of loss aversion in the Earnings and Returning 
treatments relative to the Endowment treatment. This should be manifest in higher values of A-
rate (i.e., higher cross-over points) for participants in the Earnings and Returning treatments 
relative to the Endowment treatment.  
 
We further hypothesize that increasing the sense of asset legitimacy regarding money 
used in the experiment should increase an individual’s sense of entitlement and 
therefore increase the presence of loss aversion with respect to deferring current 
consumption.  
 
Hypothesis 2  
Participants’ responses AS1 and AS2 will be higher in (i) the Earnings treatment relative to the 
Endowment treatment, (ii) the Returning treatment relative to the Endowment treatment, and 
(iii) the Returning treatment relative to the Earnings treatment. 
  
3  Results 
A total of 75 individuals participated in the study, with 24 and 26 individuals 
participating in the ‘endowment’ and ‘earnings treatments’. A total of 34 individuals 
participated in the first session of the returning treatment with 26 individuals  
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participating in the second session in which discount rates were elicited.5 The 
experiments were conducted using the software developed by Fischbacher (2007). In 
terms of demographic information regarding participants, participants were evenly split 
across gender (58% male) and ages ranged between 19 and 23.6  
Table 2 provides the summary statistics from the sessions across treatments. In terms 
of our primary variable of interest (the variable A-rate), we find no statistically 
significant differences in participants’ responses between the endowment and earnings 
treatments (Wilcoxon p=0.623). However, non-parametric Wilcoxon tests reject the 
hypotheses that A-rate responses in the returning treatment are drawn from the same 
distribution as those in the endowment and earnings treatments (p<0.01 in each 
comparison). Thus, we find that individuals in the returning treatment demonstrated, on 
average, discount rates that were over 60% higher than participants in our other 
treatments. We take this as partial support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
With respect to Hypothesis 2, we find no differences in participants’ responses regarding 
whether or not they were entitled to the money they received (i.e., outcome variable 
AS1) across all groups. However, we find that participants in the earnings and returning 
treatments felt they earned the money received more than those in the endowment 
treatment (Wilcoxon p<0.05 for variable AS2 from question 2). We identified no 
differences between the earnings and returning treatments in this regard. Thus we only 
find partial support for Hypothesis 2 with respect to AS2, but reject the hypothesis with 
respect to the variable AS1. 
With respect to the additional questions answered by participants in the 
returning treatment (i.e., questions 3 and 4), all participants indicated that the cash 
                                                      
5 Despite some attrition in the second session of the returning treatment, we found no systematic 
differences between those who returned and those who did not in terms of gender, age or 
educational status. 
6 In an analysis of the data with respect to demographic information collected, we found no 
differences across the responses of men and women (cf. Coller and Williams, 1999; McLeish and 
Oxoby, 2007).   
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brought to the second session was not the same as that given in the previous session and 
88% of participants indicated that they had spent the money given to them in the first 
session. This provides some explanation for the higher discount rates elicited in this 
treatment. If participants had spent the money, this suggests that they considered that 
money truly to be theirs (as opposed to, say, money belonging to the experimenter). As 
such deferring use of the money by two weeks would require forgoing current 
consumption or incurring a loss as suggested by the research of Kahneman et al. (1991). 
On the other hand, participants in the endowment and earnings treatment may have 
viewed the money they received as a gain. Since incurring a loss is more costly than the 
change in well-being initiated by a similarly sized gain, participants in the returning 
treatment (who could experience a $40 loss to current consumption) required greater 
compensation for deferring consumption relative to those in the endowment and 
earnings treatments (where $40 gains were experienced). This greater compensation was 
manifest through higher required rates of interest to wait two weeks for payment (i.e., 
higher elicited discount rates). 
4  Discussion 
Our experiment demonstrates that loss aversion can be implemented in experiments 
involving intertemporal decisions by following a protocol whereby participants first 
earn money income in the laboratory and then retain this money for a period of time 
prior to the decision of interest.  
One area of growing interest where such an approach will be important is the study 
of behavioural aspects of savings decisions. Existing field evidence on savings behavior 
suggests that individuals do not save enough for the future or for contingent events. For 
example, with respect to savings for retirement, empirical evidence indicates that many 
individuals either recognize that they should save while taking no action to increase 
savings, or they have a downward bias concerning how much they are saving or need to 
save (Loewenstein et al, 1999; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, Dominitz et al, 2002). In 
explaining these findings, many have turned to the role of quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
(e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001).  
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However, as suggested by Frederick et al (2002) other considerations may influence 
intertemporal decision making. One such behavior is loss aversion and our results 
suggest that researchers who wish to explore savings behaviour through laboratory 
experiments need to account for this in their experimental design. 
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(circle A or B) 
1 $40  $40 A  B 
2 $40  $41 A  B 
3 $40  $42 A  B 
4 $40  $43 A  B 
5 $40  $44 A  B 
6 $40  $45 A  B 
7 $40  $46 A  B 
8 $40  $47 A  B 
9 $40  $48 A  B 
10 $40  $49 A  B 
11 $40  $50 A  B 
12 $40  $51 A  B 
 





  Endowment  Earnings  Returning 
Variable  Treatment  Treatment  Treatment 
A-rate 4.65 4.93 8.18 
 (1.17)  (1.55)  (1.74) 
AS1 4.96  5.00  5.09 
 (1.08) (0.89) (0.81) 
AS2 4.125  6.11  6.09 
 (0.94)  (0.59)  (0.89) 
 
  
Table 2:  Summary statistics by treatment: mean (standard deviation). 